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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2641 
___________ 
 
CHRIS ANN JAYE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY; 
 DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL IONE K. CURVA, in her Official Capacity;  
 THE HON. PETER A. BUCHSBAUM, individually and in his  
 Official Capacity as Judge of the Law Division of Hunterdon County;  
 THE HON. YOLANDA CICCONE, individually and in her  
 Official Capacity of Assignment Judge Law Judge of the  
 Superior Court of Hunterdon, Somerset and Warren;  
 THE HON. MARY C. JACOBSON, in her Official Capacity as  
 Assignment Judge and Presiding Judge in the Law Division of the  
 Superior Court of Mercer County;  
 HON. PATRICK MCMANIMON, in his Official Capacity as  
 Special Civil Part Judge of the Superior Court of Mercer County;  
 CHRISTOPHER KOOS, in his Official Capacity as Civil Division Team Leader 
 for the Superior Court of Mercer County;  
 JUDITH IRIZZARI, in her Official Capacity as  
 Civil Division Manager for the Superior Court of Mercer County;  
 CAROLINE RECORD, individually and in her Official Capacity as  
 NJ Supreme Court's Secretary for the Office of Attorney Ethics; 
 JOHN DOES 1-25 (FICTITIOUS NAMES), individually and  
 in their official capacities as State actors,  
 including but not limited to the NJ Judgment Processing Service Defendants 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-07471) 
District Judge:  Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
____________________________________ 
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 15, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 22, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Chris Ann Jaye, proceeding pro se, appeals from orders of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing her civil rights action and her 
post-judgment motion for reconsideration.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.  
 Jaye filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil 
Rights Act, which she later amended in response to an order directing her to comply with 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), alleging that various New Jersey state court judges, 
state court staff, and the New Jersey Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General 
violated her rights in connection with several state court cases.  Those cases involve an 
ongoing dispute between Jaye and her condominium association regarding unpaid 
condominium fees.  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss.  The District Court dismissed 
the second amended complaint, determining that it still failed to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 8(a) and that, in any event, Jaye’s claims were subject to dismissal 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  The 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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District Court’s order also “terminated” various other motions that Jaye had filed in the 
case, including motions to stay the state court proceedings.  Jaye timely appealed.  She 
also filed a “Motion to Vacate,” which the District Court denied.  Jaye filed another 
notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the dismissal of 
the complaint is de novo.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); cf. 
Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(exercising plenary review over district court’s invocation of the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine).  We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s order denying Jaye’s 
motion for reconsideration.  See Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2011).  
We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.   See Fairview Twp. v. EPA, 773 
F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985).    
 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a District Court of jurisdiction to review, 
in some circumstances, a state court adjudication.1  See Turner, 449 F.3d at 547.  In 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005), the 
Supreme Court emphasized the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, holding 
that it “is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”  It is 
difficult to fully determine the status of all of Jaye’s state court cases, as she has filed 
                                              
1 The doctrine is derived from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
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several different lawsuits concerning her condominium fees.  But at least some of her 
claims seek relief for injuries caused by judgments that were entered against her before 
she commenced the underlying action.  To the extent that is the case, the District Court 
correctly determined that those claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See 
Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 
2010) (stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives lower federal courts of 
jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments).   
 To the extent, however, that Jaye’s claims stem from rulings in matters that are 
ongoing in state court, those claims are not barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  
Nevertheless, they are subject to dismissal on other grounds.2  In particular, the New 
Jersey Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General are immune from suit for money 
damages under the Eleventh Amendment.  See Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. 
Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment … has been 
interpreted to render states—and, by extension, state agencies and departments and 
officials when the state is the real party in interest—generally immune from suit by 
                                              
2 Jaye sought to stay any ongoing state court proceedings, but the District Court properly 
denied this request.  The Anti-Injunction Act provides that “[a] court of the United States 
may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly 
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect 
or effectuate its judgments.”  28 U.S.C. § 2283.  These exceptions do not apply here.  
Only the “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction” exception is even remotely relevant to this 
action and, as we have explained, it applies only when the state court proceedings “so 
interfere with a federal court’s consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously 
impair the federal court’s flexibility to decide that case.”  1975 Salaried Ret. Plan for 
Eligible Emps. of Crucible, Inc. v. Nobers, 968 F.2d 401, 408 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  The circumstances of this case do not meet this 
standard. 
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private parties in federal court.”); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 
465 U.S. 89, 119-20 (1984) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars state law claims 
against state officials in federal court).  In addition, the named judges (and members of 
their staff and court personnel) are immune from suit to the extent they were sued in their 
individual and official capacities.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) 
(judges immune from suit unless they act in complete absence of jurisdiction); Gallas v. 
Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 772-73 (3d Cir. 2000) (court personnel entitled to 
quasi-judicial immunity for alleged acts pursuant to judge’s instructions).  Jaye did not 
set forth information which might suggest that the judges in her cases acted in the 
absence of all jurisdiction.  Nor did she set forth information which might show that court 
personnel acted contrary to judicial instruction.  Rather, Jaye appears to be merely 
dissatisfied with the judicial rulings against her.  See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 
303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has 
absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.”).   
 The District Court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Jaye’s “Motion to 
Vacate.”  That motion, which the District Court treated as seeking relief under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), alleged that the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
mischaracterized the finality of her state court judgments, misinterpreted her claims as 
arising out of those judgments, and misapplied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Rather 
than identify instances of fraud or misconduct, however, these allegations challenge the 
substance of the Defendants’ arguments.  See Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 206-07 
(3d Cir. 1983) (to prevail under Rule 60(b)(3) the moving party must establish that the 
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adverse party engaged in fraud or other misconduct, and that this misconduct prevented 
the moving party from fully and fairly presenting her case).  Indeed, Jaye’s “Motion to 
Vacate” essentially sought to relitigate issues the District Court had already decided.  But 
Rule 60(b) relief is available “only in cases evidencing extraordinary circumstances” and 
is not a substitute for an appeal.  Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.3  
                                              
3 Jaye’s motion to expand the record and the Appellees’ motion for leave to file a 
supplemental appendix are granted.  But we deny Jaye’s motion to strike Appellees’ brief 
and their motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix, as well as her opposition to 
the Appellees’ submission of a supplemental appendix.  We also deny Jaye’s motion for 
judicial notice, her motion to summarily set aside, her motion to summarily remand, and 
her letter titled “Still Waiting on Reason for Basis for Delay.”  To the extent that Jaye’s 
letter captioned “Judge Shipp is Unfit to Act as a Federal Judge” seeks his 
disqualification, relief is denied.  We also deny Jaye’s “Emergent Injunctive Relief to 
Stay All Federal Cases and Motion to Transfer Case and Appeal to a Neutral Venue” and 
her “Motion for Emergent Change of Venue.” 
